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Abstract 
The Nigerian oil and gas industry has been experiencing a showdown since the announcement of the downstream oil 
deregulation policy. This paper, therefore, seeks to analyse the relationship between deregulation of the downstream 
sector and Nigerian economic performance using annual data from 1980 to 2009. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression method was employed to analyze the data. Chow Test was used to determine parameter stability of the 
regression model, while Granger Causality Test was used to predict the direction of influence. The findings reveal that 
increase in price of petroleum products and inflation rate were not as a result of deregulation, and deregulating price 
of petroleum products significantly influence economic growth with marginal inflation. The paper recommends that 
government should encourage private sector participation in the oil and gas industry. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Oil and gas industry has continued to serve the mainstay of the Nigerian economy since 1956 when oil was 
discovered at Oloibiri in the Niger Delta region. The industry, no doubt, is widely acknowledged at the nation’s live-
wire because it creates employment opportunities for Nigerians (particularly with the enactment of the Local Content 
policy), contributes to Nigeria’s gross domestic product as well as government revenue, boosts foreign exchange 
reserves, provides cheap and readily available sources of energy for industry and commerce through the operations of 
the local refinery and the utilization of locally discovered natural gas (Odularu, 2008). Nonetheless, despite this benefit, 
the oil industry is plagued by various problems which the Federal government believed that deregulation of the 
downstream sector was a solution.     
In recent years, deregulation of the downstream sector of the oil and gas industry has become a controversial 
issue in Nigeria. In 2003, the Federal government bedevilled with fiscal deficit, high external debt, unfavourable 
balance of payment and inability to sustain the huge subsidy for fuels announced her intention to deregulate the 
downstream sector of the petroleum industry. Since the announcement, Nigerians have lost count about how many 
times organized Labour went on strike over downstream oil deregulation policy. 
Nigeria, OPEC’s sixth largest crude oil producer, with her abundant natural resources still import and pay 
international prices for a natural resources it has in abundance. The Federal Government complained that the cost of 
subsidizing importation which was estimated to be as high as $1.5 billion annually (Ibanga, 2006) has become 
unbearable to sustain, and that deregulation of the downstream sector would attract investors into the oil and gas 
industry and provoke competition which would result in reduction in the prices of petroleum products.  
As part of the deregulation policy, the Federal Government stopped the sale of oil to Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) as the government was buying refined products at huge international prices only to sell 
at a heavily subsidized rate. NNPC now buys at the prevailing international price, since its refineries are almost down. 
Thus, it exports and uses the proceeds to import refined fuel for local consumption. Nigerians are saddled with 
continuous increase in the cost of locally consumed fuel as international oil prices rise. NNPC, major and independent 
marketers, have become importers of petroleum products, leaving pricing at the mercy of market forces. Therefore, it 
has become imperative to evaluate the impact of deregulation of the downstream sector on the Nigerian economy. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW/THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The Nigerian Oil and gas industry can be categorized into two main sub-sectors, namely, upstream and 
downstream sectors. The upstream sector covers all the activities leading to the exploration and drilling of crude oil, 
while the downstream sector covers the processing of crude oil, its distribution as well as sales. In other words, the 
downstream oil industry is the business of importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping, transporting, processing, 
refining, storing, distributing, marketing and/or selling, crude oil, gasoline, diesel, liquefied petroleum gas, kerosene, 
and other petroleum and crude oil products (Philippine RA 8180, Sec.4). 
Deregulation is the process of complete removal of government regulations or control on an industry, 
especially with regard to pricing of products. It is the deliberate removal of monopoly rights enjoyed by an enterprise in 
a particular sector of any economy. According to Kupolokun (2005), deregulation is the process of transforming an 
economy to one that is open to all interested players and is usually driven by the market forces. Thus, there is minimal 
role of government in economic sector and industries.  
Downstream oil deregulation refers to the removal of protection with regard to importation, processing and 
retailing of petroleum products as well as the determination of prices of petroleum products. Kupolokun (2005) noted 
that the main goals of deregulation initiatives include to: 
 Dismantle the natural monopoly of the state owned enterprise by privatizing and deregulating price controls. 
 Create competition in the downstream sector by encouraging more companies to get involved and eventually 
supplying the market at competitive pricing levels. 
 Reduce the cost government incurs on subsidizing the sector which runs as high as $1.5 billion annually, and 
can consequently use the resources freed up to handle the socio-economic and welfare needs of the Nigerian 
people. 
 Boost Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to the Nigerian economy. 
 Reduce transportation costs of petroleum products and people. 
In a nutshell, deregulation is to promote competition in areas previously considered to be natural monopoly of an 
individual, group of people or government enterprises.  
From literatures, there are two phases of deregulation - partial and full deregulation. In partial deregulation, 
there is less government regulation in order to increase efficiency and protect consumer’s rights, while full deregulation 
is the complete removal of controls on oil price setting (PIDS, 2000; DPCGP, 2007). Currently, the Nigerian petroleum 
industry is still exercising partial deregulation where government intervenes in order to increase efficiency and protect 
consumers from exorbitant prices of petroleum products. This minimal intervention also helps to promote and protect 
employment within the industry and to facilitate the entry of disadvantaged communities in the sector. 
The concept of downstream oil deregulation is neither new nor restricted to Nigeria, as it has for long been 
operated in several other oil-producing countries. Most developed countries that deregulated their oil sector had 
experienced or achieved economic growth. The countries include Canada, Japan, United States, Brazil, to mention but a 
few. However, countries like Argentina, Philippine, South Africa, etc did not find downstream oil deregulation 
favourable.  
In Nigeria, there have been divergent opinions expressed by the public since the introduction of deregulation 
policy to the downstream sector. Some Nigerians see the policy as a way of introducing high fuel prices by the 
government, while other people view it as a way of ending the scarcity and shortages of petroleum products. 
The government believes that subsidy for fuels distort the system, and encourages corruption; that deregulation 
will offer more benefits to Nigerians because the oil market will become more competitive and efficient, and the 
resulting benefits will be passed on to Nigerians in the form of lower product prices, better quality of service and ease 
as well as constant availability of the product (Yar’adua, 2009). Odidison (2003) stated that deregulation would bring 
sanity into the oil and gas industry since smuggling of petroleum products, vandalizatoin of pipelines and all other vices 
in the sector will be totally removed. According to him, domestic price of oil will increase and the smugglers being 
irrational are likely to reduce their activities. Consequent upon this, the neighbouring countries that rely on smuggled 
petroleum products would experience scarcity and as such would be forced to take the legal and normal route to buy 
fuel. Akinmade (2003) explained that the emergence of the private refineries will create a better maintenance culture of 
the refinery and this will likely reduce unemployment by employing both skilled and unskilled labour. They would also 
engage in the training of manpower in Nigeria and thereby contribute to human development in the country. 
In the other hand, some scholars and pressure groups in the country strongly believed that deregulation of the 
downstream oil sector will have negative effects on the Nigeria economy. Eson (2002) sees deregulation in Nigeria as a 
measure that might give marketers of petroleum products the opportunity to fix prices, which in most cases lead to 
exploitation of the average Nigerian. Ogunbodede, Ilesanmi and Olurankinse (2010) explained that deregulation which 
results in increase in fuel price have a multiplier effects on the economy; that is, the ensuing inflation would rubbish the 
income of the worker in such a way that greater percentage of their income would be spent on consumption. This in 
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effect limits their ability to save and thus leads to little or no incentives to save. Therefore, for this paper, multivariate 
linear regression model of the Nigerian economy is constructed to examine the impact of downstream oil deregulation 




This study employs annual data from 1980 to 2009, obtained from two sources: Central Bank of Nigeria 
Statistical Bulletin and National Bureau of Statistics. The method of analysis is that of Ordinary Least Squares 
regression. The economic model used in the study is given as: 
𝒀𝒊 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝒊𝑿𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊 
Where Y is the dependent variable, β0 is constant, βi is the coefficient of the explanatory variable, Xit is the 
explanatory variable, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term which comprises all other unobserved variables. The study employs 
indicators such as price of Premium Motor Spirit (PMS), Inflation rate (INFLA), and Unemployment rate (UNEMPL) 
as the independent (explanatory) variable to measure effect of downstream oil deregulation, while real GDP as the 
dependent (explained) variable to measure economic growth. Adopting a log-linear specification and assuming linearity 
among variables, thus, the economic model evolves as: 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑀𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
A priori Specification: the expected signs of the coefficients of the explanatory variables are:  
𝛽1 > 0, 𝛽2 > 0, 𝛽3 > 0 
 
Chow Test: Testing for Structural/Parameter Stability of Regression Model 
Chow Test was applied to determine if there was structural break in the period from 1980 to 2009 due to the 
introduction of the downstream oil deregulation policy. Two periods were observed: pre- and post-deregulation periods. 
Thus we have three possible regressions: 
Time period 1980-2002: 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑡 = 𝜆1 + 𝜆2𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑋𝑡+. . . +𝜀1𝑡 ..................................................(1) 
Time period 2003-2009: 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑡 = 𝛾1 + 𝛾2𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑋𝑡+. . . +𝜀2𝑡 ..................................................(2) 
Time period 1980-2009: 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑋𝑡+. . . +𝜀𝑡 ...................................................(3) 
Regression (3) assumes there is no difference between the two time periods; that is, no structural break over the entire 
period (1980-2009) caused by the deregulation policy. Therefore, the null hypothesis is given as: 
 H0: Regressions (1) and (2) are statistically the same (i.e. no structural break) 
 
To test this hypothesis, F-statistic is computed using the residual sum of squares of the above regressions: 
𝐹 =
(𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅 − 𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑅)/𝑘
(𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑅)/(𝑛1 + 𝑛2 − 2𝑘)
    ~     𝐹[𝑘,(𝑛1+𝑛2−2𝑘)] 
  
          where RSSUR = Unrestricted Residual Sum of Squares = RSS1 +RSS2  
         RSSR = Restricted Residual Sum of Squares = R3 
  k = number of parameters estimated 
The null hypothesis of parameter stability is accepted if computed F value does not exceed the critical F value; 
otherwise, it is rejected. 
 
Granger Causality Test: Testing for Direction of Influence 
In order to determine whether changes in one variable are a cause of changes in another, we employed the 
Granger (1969) causality test. Granger causality method of investigating whether A causes B is to see how much of 
current B can be explained by past values of B and then to see whether by including lagged values of A we can improve 
the explanation of B. B is said to be Granger-caused by variable A if A helps in the prediction of B, or if the coefficients 
on the lagged A’s are statistically significant (Eviews User’s Guide 1994-1997). The main idea of causality is quite 
simple, if A causes B, then changes in A should precede changes in B (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). This 
characteristic makes causality test an important one in the test of endogeniety. 
If A causes B, then A should help to predict B. in other words, in a regression of B against past values of B, the 
addition of past values of A as explanatory variables should contribute significantly to the explanatory power of the 
regression. To test the null hypothesis of “A does not cause B”, we regress B against its lagged values and the lagged 
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An example of a pairwise causality test to determine whether GDP “causes” fuel price or fuel price “causes” GDP this 
study is given as: 












From the above, a simple F-test which uses the sum of squared residuals (RSS) from equation the above equations is 




    ~    𝐹[𝑚,(𝑛−𝑘)] 
 
Where m is the number of parameter restrictions, n is the number of observations, and k is the number of estimated 
parameters in the unrestricted regression. 
The resultant F is then used to determine whether or not the lagged values of A contribute significantly to the 
explanatory power of the unrestricted regression. If they do, we can reject the hypothesis of “A causes B” and conclude 

























Presentation of Data 





REAL GDP                     
(N' Million) 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
RATE   (%) 
INFLATION RATE     
(%) 
1980 0.15 31546.8 6.4 9.9 
1981 0.15 205222.1 6.4 20.9 
1982 0.20 199685.3 6.4 7.7 
1983 0.30 185598.1 6.4 23.2 
1984 0.30 183563.0 6.2 39.6 
1985 0.39 201036.3 6.1 5.5 
1986 0.39 205971.4 5.3 5.4 
1987 0.42 204806.5 7.0 10.2 
1988 0.60 219875.6 5.3 38.3 
1989 0.60 236729.6 4.5 40.9 
1990 0.70 267550.0 3.5 7.5 
1991 0.70 265379.1 3.1 13.0 
1992 5.00 271365.5 3.4 44.5 
1993 3.25 274833.3 2.7 57.2 
1994 11.00 275450.6 2.0 57.0 
1995 11.00 281407.4 1.8 72.8 
1996 11.00 293745.4 3.4 29.3 
1997 15.00 302022.5 3.2 8.5 
1998 15.00 310890.1 3.2 10.0 
1999 20.00 312183.5 3.1 6.6 
2000 22.00 329178.7 4.7 6.9 
2001 26.00 356994.3 4.2 18.9 
2002 30.00 433203.5 3.0 12.9 
2003 40.00 477533.0 2.9 14.0 
2004 49.00 527576.0 2.8 15.0 
2005 52.00 561931.4 3.3 17.9 
2006 64.50 595821.6 3.5 8.2 
2007 75.00 634251.1 3.5 5.4 
2008 75.00 674889.0 4.9 11.6 
2009 65.00 657771.4 4.9 12.4 
 









IV. FINDINGS/POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Using E-View3.1 statistical package, we obtain the following results: 
 
Table 1: Pre-deregulation (1980-2002) 
Dependent Variable: LOGRGDP 
Method: Least Squares 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 307180.4 49923.72 6.152995 0.0000 
LOGPMS 4947.615 1199.138 4.125977 0.0006 
LOGINFLA -236.9013 540.9394 -0.437944 0.6664 
LOGUNEMPL -19240.12 7783.941 -2.471771 0.0231 
R-squared 0.760259            Mean dependent var 254271.2 
Adjusted R-squared 0.722405            S.D. dependent var 78215.65 
S.E. of regression 41209.68            Akaike info criterion 24.24750 
Sum squared resid 3.23E+10            Schwarz criterion 24.44498 
Log likelihood -274.8463            F-statistic 20.08407 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.243078            Prob(F-statistic) 0.000004 
 
 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃 = 307180.4 + 4947.6𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑀𝑆 − 236.9𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴 − 19240.1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿 
                t = (6.153)*             (4.126)*        (-0.438)    (-2.472)* 
   R2 = 0.76,          RSS1 = 3.23E+10,       F = 20.084*,        d = 1.243,        n1 = 23 
 
 
Table 2: Post-deregulation (2003-2009) 
Dependent Variable: LOGRGDP 
Method: Least Squares 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 192627.5 49014.89 3.929980 0.0293 
LOGPMS 4373.321 821.0368 5.326584 0.0129 
LOGINFLA 2637.104 1911.432 1.379648 0.2615 
LOGUNEMPL 27890.08 9089.550 3.068367 0.0546 
R-squared 0.987619             Mean dependent var 589967.6 
Adjusted R-squared 0.975239             S.D. dependent var 72023.81 
S.E. of regression 11333.46             Akaike info criterion 21.80447 
Sum squared resid 3.85E+08             Schwarz criterion 21.77356 
Log likelihood -72.31563             F-statistic 79.77129 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.430263             Prob(F-statistic) 0.002330 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃 = 192627.5 + 4373.3𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑀𝑆 + 2637.1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴 + 27890.1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿 
                t = (3.930)*             (5.327)*        (1.380)     (3.068)* 
    R2 = 0.99,          RSS2 = 3.85E+8,       F = 79.771*,       d = 2.430,       n2 = 7 
 
 
Table 3: Entire Period (1980-2009) 
Dependent Variable: LOGRGDP 
Method: Least Squares 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 264460.7 35577.13 7.433446 0.0000 
LOGPMS 6124.086 347.5520 17.62063 0.0000 
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LOGINFLA 61.04787 480.0581 0.127168 0.8998 
LOGUNEMPL -12871.99 5839.870 -2.204157 0.0366 
R-squared 0.947617              Mean dependent var 332600.4 
Adjusted R-squared 0.941573              S.D. dependent var 162999.3 
S.E. of regression 39399.76              Akaike info criterion 24.12447 
Sum squared resid 4.04E+10              Schwarz criterion 24.31130 
Log likelihood -357.8671              F-statistic 156.7812 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.190183              Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃 = 264460.7 + 6124.1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑀𝑆 + 61.04𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴 − 12871.9𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿 
                t = (7.433)*             (17.620)*        (0.127)     (-2.204)* 
    R2 = 0.95,          RSS3 = 4.04E+10,       F = 156.781*,       d = 1.190,        n3 = 30 
* Shows statistical significance at 1% and/or 5% 
 
 
Chow Test: The computed F value is obtained as 
𝐹 =
(4.04 × 1010 − 3.27 × 1010)/4
(3.27 × 1010)/22
= 1.30   
 
and the critical F value is        𝐹(4,22) = 4.31 
 
Since the computed F value is less than the critical F value, the null hypothesis is accepted that there is no 
structural break between 1980 and 2009 as a result of the downstream oil deregulation policy. Thus, the increase in 
prices of petroleum products was not as a result of the deregulation. After deregulation took effect, prices of petroleum 
products still continued to rise. The country has been experiencing fuel price increases even before deregulation took 
effect because Nigeria is a net importer of petroleum. Therefore, when the prices of petroleum products in the 
international market increase, the local oil industry has little choice but to adopt the risen prices. Any changes in the 
international oil prices directly affect pump price. The analysis of this study is, therefore, based on regression (3). 
The t-statistics shows that price of petroleum products (t = 17.62, p = 0.000) and unemployment rate (t = -2.2, 
p = 0.036) are individually statistically significant to economic growth at 5% level of significance, except inflation rate 
(t = 0.13, p = 0.900). The F-statistics value (156.781) shows that the overall model is statistically significant at 1% and 
5% levels of significance. This implies that prices of petroleum products (especially, fuel), inflation rate and 
unemployment rate are crucial indicators to consider during the deregulation of the downstream sector. This is 
corroborated by the R2 value of 0.95 which shows that about 95 percent of the variation in Nigerian economic 
performance is explained by price of petroleum products, inflation and unemployment rates.  
The model in Table 3 further reveals that since the period of economic reforms like the Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) in the 1980’s, there has been a strong positive relationship between price of petroleum products and 
economic growth. So, deregulating the downstream sector will result in increase in the price of petroleum products in 
the short-run which will consequently lead to a boost in economic growth but with marginal inflation in the long-run. 
Thus, the economy enjoys decrease in unemployment rate as private sector participation will encourage competition and 
efficiency by employing both skilled and unskilled labour to sustain the competition. 
 
Table 4: Granger Causality Tests 
 
  Null Hypothesis:  F-Statistic P-value Decision 
  LogINFLA does not Granger Cause LogRGDP   0.80766  0.37706 Do not reject 
  LogRGDP does not Granger Cause LogINFLA  0.82613  0.37174 Do not reject 
  LogPMS does not Granger Cause LogRGDP   25.8604  2.7E-05 Reject 
  LogRGDP does not Granger Cause LogPMS  1.90417  0.17936 Do not reject 
  LogUNEMPL does not Granger Cause LogRGDP   0.04205  0.83912 Do not reject 
  LogRGDP does not Granger Cause LogUNEMPL  0.24418  0.62535 Do not reject 
  LogPMS does not Granger Cause LogINFLA   1.06069  0.31254 Do not reject 
  LogINFLA does not Granger Cause LogPMS  0.01059  0.91884 Do not reject 
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  LogUNEMPL does not Granger Cause LogINFLA   0.00941  0.92349 Do not reject 
  LogINFLA does not Granger Cause LogUNEMPL  1.18094  0.28714 Do not reject 
  LogUNEMPL does not Granger Cause LogPMS   3.95926  0.05723 Do not reject 
  LogPMS does not Granger Cause LogUNEMPL  0.97268  0.33310 Do not reject 
 
Table 4 presents the results of pairwise Granger causality among the real GDP, fuel price, inflation and 
unemployment rates. The results show that only the null hypothesis that fuel price does not granger cause real GDP 
could be safely rejected at 1 percent level – a unidirectional causality emanates from fuel prices to real GDP. Thus, the 
prices of petroleum products Granger cause (influence) economic growth. This implies that deregulating prices of 
petroleum products in Nigeria caused a boost in the economic performance as the huge subsidy which was formerly 
used for fuel importation is now diverted to tackle socio-economic and welfare needs of the Nigerians.  
V. RECOMMENDATION/CONCLUSION 
The econometric findings presented in this study reveal that increase in prices of petroleum products was not 
due to deregulation, but increase in international oil prices. Increase in prices of petroleum products significantly 
influence economic growth within the period of study, because petroleum products are demand inelastic. Although the 
inflation rate marginally increased, the rate of unemployment decreased with increase in economic growth. 
Based on these findings, it is inevitable to provide a policy recommendation that would be applicable to the 
Nigerian economy: 
 Government should get all the four refineries working at all costs. This will help to reduce the huge subsidy 
burden and the money spent on refined fuel importation will be diverted to infrastructural development for the 
economy. 
 Government should encourage more private sector participation so that better equipped oil infrastructures 
(refineries and pipelines) can be built and the cost of refining crude oil and its distribution will reduce. 
 Government, through the Petroleum Product Regulatory Agency (PPPRA), should fix prices of petroleum 
products, and any corrupt official or firm that wants to make abnormal profit should be made to face the law. 
 Securities should be beefed-up to check the smuggling of refined oil across the borders. 
 Special attention should be given to indigenes of the Niger-delta region to reduce unrest as well as 
vandalization of petroleum infrastructures. 
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